The value of cooperation in pursuit-evasion games is investigated. The considered setting is that of three pursuers chasing one evader in a planar environment. The optimal evader trajectory for a well-known decentralized pursuer strategy is characterized.
less than one-half of that resulting from the decentralized strategy. Moreover, it is shown that the above bounds are tight, in the sense that there exist games in which the bounds are actually achieved. Finally, the maximum advantage deriving from cooperation is quantified for some specific game initial conditions. The paper is structured as follows. In Section II, the three-pursuer one-evader game is formulated. In Section III, the decentralized pursuit strategy proposed in [11] is recalled and the corresponding optimal evader's strategy is devised along with the resulting game length. In Section IV, a lower bound on capture time is derived, irrespectively of the strategy adopted by the pursuers. A comparison between the game duration for cooperative and decentralized pursuers' strategies is reported in Section V while some examples of games are reported in Section VI. Conclusions and future developments are reported in Section VII.
II. PURSUIT-EVASION GAME

A. Notation
Let R n be the n-dimensional Euclidean space and · be the Euclidean norm. The transpose of a vector v is denoted by v ′ . Let V, W ∈ R 2 , we denote by V W the segment with V and W as endpoints. Let V, v ∈ R 2 , we denote by L(V, v) the line passing through V with direction v, i.e., L(V, v) = {X ∈ R 2 : X = V + αv, α ∈ R}.
B. Problem formulation
A pursuit-evasion game involving three pursuers is considered. It is assumed that the players move in an open and empty two-dimensional environment. Let E(t) ∈ R 2 and P i (t) ∈ R 2 , i = 1, 2, 3, denote the evader and pursuers location at time t, respectively. The aim of the pursuers is to capture the evader, i.e., P i (t) = E(t) for at least one i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, at some time t.
The following assumptions are enforced throughout the text.
Assumption 1: The pursuers and the evader have the same speed, set to 1 without loss of generality. Moreover, we assume the players have simple motion, i.e., they can freely move in any direction.
Assumption 2:
The initial evader position is strictly inside the convex hull of the pursuers.
If the players move at the same speed, enforcing Assumption 2 is standard, otherwise the evader may easily escape going straight along a direction opposite to the convex hull of the pursuers [18] . On the contrary, if Assumption 2 holds, there exist pursuers' strategies which guarantee capture of the evader in finite time [18] , [11] .
For a given configuration of the players at time t, let us define as V(t) the Voronoi cell associated to the evader, i.e., the region of the plane closer to the evader than to the pursuers, at time t. Under Assumptions 1-2, V(t) turns out to be a triangle; let us denote by V i (t), i = 1, 2, 3, its vertices. For a given triangle V, we denote by l, m, s the longest, medium and smallest edge of V, respectively. Moreover, we name the vertices of V such that V 1 is the vertex joining the longest and medium edges, while pursuers are labeled such that P i is the pursuer farthest from V i . It can be easily observed that (see Fig. 1 )
The pursuit game can be played in continuous time, in which players simultaneously set their velocities, or discrete time, when players move in turn. In the latter case, by convention, the evader moves first, and then all pursuers move simultaneously after they have observed the evader's move. Let e(t) ∈ R 2 and w i (t) ∈ R 2 , i = 1, 2, 3, be such that e(t) = 1 and w i (t) = 1.
In continuous-time games, the motion models are   Ė (t) = e(t)
while in discrete-time games they move following    E(t + 1) = E(t) + e(t)
In this paper, two classes of pursuers' strategies are considered: decentralized (uncoordinated) and cooperative (coordinated). A pursuers' strategy is said decentralized if each pursuer does not have information about the other pursuers and computes its move solely on the base of the evader position and move (i.e., E(t) and e(t)) and its own state P i (t).
On the contrary, in the cooperative case, each pursuer knows the full game state and chooses its move depending on P 1 (t), P 2 (t), P 3 (t), E(t) and e(t). In both cases, we assume the evader has a complete knowledge of the state of the game.
III. DECENTRALIZED PURSUIT STRATEGY
In this section, a decentralized pursuers' strategy is recalled. It has been proposed in [12] for the continuous-time framework, and in [11] (under the name "Planes") within the discrete-time setting. Such a strategy is designed in R n and it guarantees capture in finite time under Assumptions 1-2. In this paper, we will restrict the analysis to the two-dimensional space.
Let C i (t) = (P i (t) + E(t))/2 and z i (t) = P i (t) − E(t), i = 1, 2, 3. Denote by z i (t) ⊥ a vector orthogonal to z i (t). Define
For both models (2) and (3), define the pursuers' moves w i (t), i = 1, 2, 3, as follows (see Fig. 1 )
In words, when the evader moves towards an edge of the Voronoi cell (condition (4b)), the corresponding pursuer makes a specular move which leaves the edge unchanged. Conversely, if the evader moves away from that edge (condition (4a)), the pursuer makes the same move of the evader, thus causing a shrinking of the Voronoi cell (in Fig. 1 , this occurs for pursuer P 3 ). It is worth remarking that in the latter case, the direction of the edge of the Voronoi cell does not change. Therefore, all the Voronoi cells throughout the entire game are similar triangles, no matter of the path followed by the evader.
We refer to the decentralized pursuers' strategy in (4a)-(4b) as D-strategy. Notice that in (4a)-(4b) each pursuer's move depends solely on the evader and its own state.
The results presented in this paper hold for both the continuous-time and the discrete-time framework. However, in the discrete-time approach, such results do not take into account the quantization effect introduced by the discrete move, see e.g., [19] , [20] . Therefore, for ease of exposition, in the sequel we will refer to the continuous-time setting. 
A. Optimal evasion strategy against the D-strategy
Hereafter, a pursuers' strategy will be said optimal when it guarantees capture in minimum time, while an evader's strategy is optimal if it guarantees survival of the evader for the longest time. In this subsection, an optimal evader's strategy is devised for games in which the pursuers play the D-strategy. Let us name such strategy as E. It is worthwhile to notice that there exist several evader strategies which lead to the same optimal capture time; we will just focus on one of them.
Let E(0), P i (0), i = 1, 2, 3, be given, and let V(0) be the corresponding Voronoi cell. Without loss of generality let us assume the longest edge of
and denote by S and Q the intersection points between the line passing through E(0) parallel to the longest side of the triangle and V(0) (see Fig. 2 ), i.e.,
and
Define the unitary vectors connecting the vertices of
In a similar way, define
Let us now define the evader's strategy E as follows, see Fig. 2 .
3) Once in V 1 (0), it moves towards V 2 (0), until it reaches the farthest vertex of the current Voronoi cell, where it is captured.
Remark 1:
In order to simplify the exposition, when it is stated that the evader moves to a point which lies on the boundary of V, we actually mean that it moves to an interior point of V which is arbitrarily close to the boundary. In fact, such a move is feasible and safe, due to the fact that the evader can reach any point inside V without being captured, by definition of the Voronoi cell. For instance, referring to item 1) of the E-strategy, the evader will move along v QE to a point Q such that Q − Q < δ, for a small δ > 0. In this respect, all the results presented in the paper must be intended as limit results, obtained by letting δ tend to 0. In the next theorem, it is proved that the E-strategy is optimal for the evader when the pursuers play the D-strategy, and the related game length M D is given.
Theorem 1: Let the pursuers play the D-strategy and the evader play the E-strategy. Then, the game will last for a time
Moreover, the E-strategy is optimal for the evader.
See appendix.
Remark 2: In [12] , an upper bound on the capture time is reported for the generic game played in R n involving m pursuers. Let z i = P i − E, by fixing n = 2 and m = 3, such bound turns out to be
It can be shown that B P is in general much larger than the exact number of moves given by Theorem 1. For instance, for IV. LOWER BOUND ON CAPTURE TIME Assume all players have complete information about the state of the game. The following theorem gives a lower bound B on the capture time, i.e., the evader, playing a suitable strategy, may avoid capture for at least a time B, for any possible pursuers' strategy.
Then, the evader is able to survive for at least a time B, where
Proof: Let us consider the following evader's strategy. From its initial position
, it can be arbitrarily approached, irrespectively of the pursuers' strategy.
Since the speed of the pursuers is set to 1, by (12) the distance between the evader and the pursuer P i at time τ 1 is such that
Let Z = (E(τ 1 ) + P i (τ 1 ))/2 be the midpoint between E(τ 1 ) and P i (τ 1 ). By the definition of Voronoi cell, Z lies on the boundary of V(τ 1 ). Assuming the evader goes straight to Z, it covers a distance
and then it is captured in Z. Hence, the time needed to cover the entire path turns out to be
Therefore, the right hand side of (13) is a lower bound to the evader's survival time. By taking the maximum with respect to i = 1, 2, 3, one gets the lower bound B in (10) . The expressions (11) and (12) follow from straightforward manipulations.
V. COOPERATIVE VS DECENTRALIZED PURSUIT STRATEGIES
The aim of this section is to analyze the potential advantage of the pursuers to cooperate in the pursuit task, with respect to adopting the D-strategy discussed in Section III. The following lemmas are instrumental to prove the main results. Hereafter, the time dependence is omitted when it is clear from the context.
Lemma 1:
Let the pursuers play the D-strategy and let l denote the longest edge of V. Then
Proof: Let S and Q be defined as in (5)-(6) and assume l = V 1 − V 2 , see Fig. 3 . It holds
So, by Theorem 1, 
Proof: Let l = V 1 − V 2 . By the triangle inequality,
By (1) and (11), one has
For a given pursuit-evasion game, let us denote by C the optimal cooperative pursuers' strategy and by M C the related maximum capture time, i.e., the time at which capture occurs if the evader plays at its best. The following theorem reports the relation between M C and the decentralized game length M D provided by Theorem 1.
Theorem 3: Let M D be given by (8) and M C be the optimal game length in a cooperative pursuers' setting. Then,
Proof: Since the C-strategy is optimal among all pursuit strategies, it cannot be worse than the D-strategy, and hence M C ≤ M D trivially holds. By (14) and (15), one has
where the last inequality comes from the fact that B is a lower bound on the game length for any pursuers' strategy.
By Theorem 3, one immediately has
In the sequel, we prove that there exist games in which
and other in which
this meaning that both bounds in (16) are tight. Proof: To prove the theorem, we show that there exist games for which M D = B. In fact, by (17) , M D = B implies M C = M D . Let us choose a game initial condition such that V is a right triangle and let us adopt the notation shown in Fig. 4 .
Since SQ is the hypotenuses of the triangle with vertices S, Q and V 3 , by Theorem 1, one easily gets
Moreover, by (14) , it holds
Let the smallest edge s shrink to 0. One has lim s→0 l = lim 
Moreover, it is easy to show that as s → 0, P 1 , E and V 1 tend to be collinear. This implies that By (11) , one has
Since M D ≥ B, by (20) and (21) 
Now, let ε tend to 0. In Fig. 5 , M D corresponds to the length of the bold line. By following a similar reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 4, one has
Let us now introduce a two-step cooperative pursuers' strategy, denoted by C. Let v QE = Q − E(0). Assume first that the evader keeps moving in the half-plane v ′ QE e(t) ≥ 0 for a time of at least 2ε, i.e., the evader moves to the right in Fig. 5 (the case the evader moves in the half-plane v ′ QE e(t) ≤ 0 is similar). Since ε → 0, such assumption is not restrictive. The strategy C works as follows.
1) Initially, P 1 moves towards T 1 , while P 2 and P 3 move symmetrically to the evader w.r.t. V 1 (0)V 3 (0) and V 1 (0)V 2 (0), respectively, see Fig. 6 .
2) As soon as (P 1 − E) is parallel to (V 1 − V 2 ), the pursuers play the decentralized strategy D until capture occurs.
Notice that in the first step, P 2 and P 3 move in such a way to guarantee that V 1 , v 12 and v 13 remain the same, where v 12
and v 13 are defined as in (7) .
Let τ be the time at which C-strategy switches to step 2 and by η the remaining time to conclude the game. Since by
Notice that at time τ the Voronoi cell becomes a right triangle like the one reported in the proof of Theorem 4, see Fig. 6 .
So, by Theorem 4, one has lim ε→0 η = V 1 (τ ) − V 2 (τ ) . Then, as ε tends to 0, it holds
where the last inequality comes from the fact that V 1 (τ ) = V 1 (0). Thus, by (23) and by the fact that the optimal cooperative strategy is such that M C ≤ M C , one has
Since by (16) ,
which concludes the proof.
Remark 3: Notice that the two-step pursuers' strategy C adopted in the proof of Theorem 5 is cooperative because in the first step P 1 moves orthogonally to the largest edge of V(0). Since the vertices V(0) are defined by the position of all the pursuers (and the evader), it is apparent that such strategy requires complete knowledge of the game state. 
VI. EXAMPLES
Let us define δ = MC MD . By Theorem 3, one has that in general 0.5 ≤ δ ≤ 1 . By Theorem 5, one has that there exist games such that δ = 0.5, which means that playing a cooperative strategy for the pursuers halves the game duration w.r.t. the decentralized strategy.
In this section, some examples are reported to show how the range of δ changes for some representative games. Clearly, the smaller is δ, the larger improvement can be obtained by playing a cooperative strategy.
For a given game, M D and B can be easily computed by (8) and (10), respectively. So, by (17) , one has
Define δ = B/M D . Clearly, δ provides a lower bound to δ, i.e., the maximum game length reduction which can be obtained by playing the strategy C w.r.t. D.
In Fig. 7 , the initial Voronoi cell V(0) and the evader position for different games are reported. For the sake of simplicity, the positions of the pursuers are not reported since they can be easily derived from V(0) and E(0). As an example, if V(0)
is an equilateral triangle of side l and E lies in its geometrical center (see Fig. 7 -a), one has
Moreover, notice that by (8) , when V(0) is an equilateral triangle of side l one has M D = l for any position of the evader inside V.
In Table I , the value of δ for each case depicted in Fig.7 is reported. For instance, when the initial game configuration is the isosceles triangle c), the maximum benefit of playing in a cooperative way with respect to the D-strategy is less than 4%.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The advantage of cooperation in pursuit-evasion games has been investigated, for a game in the plane with three pursuers and one evader. The maximum reduction of the capture time that can be achieved by using full information on the pursuers' state has been derived. Such reduction has been also specified in terms of the game initial conditions. This contribution can be seen as a first step towards a deeper understanding of the benefits provided by cooperation of the pursuers. Devising a cooperative pursuit strategy achieving, or at least approaching, the lower bound on the game length, is an open problem.
. Notice that, as in the previous step, only the smallest edge of V is moving in the second step. In Fig. 2 , V(τ 2 ) is colored in blue.
During the final step, the evader points towards the farthest vertex of V(τ 2 ) moving along v SE . Since the Voronoi cell at any time is a triangle similar to V(0), the farthest vertex from V 1 (τ 2 ) = V 1 (0) turns out to be V 2 (τ 2 ). By defining
, it is easy to see that τ 3 = S − E(0) and then the total traveled time is τ 1 + τ 2 + τ 3 , which coincides with (8) . At such a time, the Voronoi cell collapses to one point and capture occurs.
It remains to prove that the E-strategy is optimal when the pursuers play the D-strategy, i.e., there exists no other evader's strategy guaranteeing a longer survival. In the following, we prove that for any direction e / ∈ {v QE , v V1Q , v SE } one has dMD (t) dt < −1. So, the evader will be captured in a shorter time and hence any evader's strategy involving a move e / ∈ {v QE , v V1Q , v SE } cannot be optimal.
Let e = [cos(θ), sin(θ)] ′ with θ ∈ [0, 2π]. Assume the evader moves along direction e for a time ∆τ . We want to compute
as a function of θ. Let v ij be defined as in (7) . Let us consider the six directions ±v 12 , ±v 13 , ±v 23 , and the resulting six angular intervals in which they partition the interval [0, 2π], as shown in Fig. 8 . Let l = V 1 − V 2 , m = V 1 − V 3 and denote by ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 the angles associated to vertices V 1 and V 2 , respectively. By the law of sines, one has b sin(π − θ − ϕ 1 ) = ∆τ sin(ϕ 1 ) that is b = ∆τ sin(π − θ − ϕ 1 ) sin(ϕ 1 ) = ∆τ sin(θ + ϕ 1 ) sin(ϕ 1 ) . Thus, one has ∆M D (∆τ ) = −∆τ sin(θ + ϕ 1 ) sin(ϕ 1 ) and hence dM D (t) dt = lim ∆τ →0 ∆M (∆τ ) ∆τ = − sin(θ + ϕ 1 ) sin(ϕ 1 ) .
By using a similar reasoning, one can compute dM D (t)/dt for all the other cases. Table II reports the expressions of dM D (t)/dt for θ belonging to the six angular intervals.
By straightforward calculus arguments, it is possible to show that such a function has three maxima in [0, 2π), all equal to −1. As expected, they are achieved when θ is equal to 0, π and 2π − ϕ 1 , which correspond to the directions v QE , v SE , v V1Q adopted in the E-strategy. Therefore, any other direction leads to a greater reduction of M D and thus it cannot be optimal. 
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[π, π + ϕ 2 ) − sin(θ−ϕ 2 ) sin(ϕ 2 ) + sin(θ) sin(ϕ 1 )
5
[π + ϕ 2 , 2π − ϕ 1 ) sin(θ) sin(ϕ 1 )
